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Abstract 
A teaching program designed to foster the reflection on and development of more 
sophisticated epistemological beliefs was implemented with 29 pre-service graduate teacher 
education students at the Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. As part 
of the year-long teaching program, students were required to reflect in journal entries on the 
content of an educational psychology unit in relation to their epistemological beliefs. The 
students engaged in this teaching program (the research group) were interviewed in relation 
to their beliefs at the beginning (Time 1) and conclusion (Time 2) of the teaching program. 
Students in a comparison group were not encouraged to explicitly reflect on their 
epistemological beliefs. They were asked to complete written statements about their beliefs 
about knowing at the beginning (Time 1) and end (Time 2) of the year-long unit. 
Schommer=s (1988, 1990) epistemological beliefs questionnaire was administered to both the 
comparison and research groups at Time 1 and Time 2. This questionnaire measured beliefs 
about knowing. The results of both the quantitative and qualitative data analysis indicated 
that the group of students engaged in the teaching program experienced more growth in 
sophisticated epistemological beliefs. The success of the teaching program has implications 
for how teacher educators develop learning environments. 
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Changing epistemological beliefs in pre-service teacher education students 
 
Background 
In the current study, the intention was to improve learning generally for preservice 
teacher education students by engaging them in a teaching program focussed on developing 
their epistemological beliefs. Epistemological beliefs or beliefs about knowing reflect an 
individual’s views on what knowledge is, how it can be gained, its degree of certainty, and 
the limits and criteria for determining knowledge (Perry, 1981). It was anticipated that 
helping students to know and learn more meaningfully would enable these prospective 
teachers to promote similar learning outcomes in the primary school children for whom they 
would ultimately have responsibility. A substantial body of research is now indicating that 
teacher educators need to focus on teacher thinking and teacher beliefs to facilitate changes in 
the teaching-learning process (Fang, 1996; Richardson, Anders, Tidwell & Lloyd, 1991).  
Ways of understanding how teaching and learning may be improved in teacher education 
settings may be informed by epistemological beliefs research and theory (Beers, 1984; Hofer, 
1994; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schommer, 1990, 1993a, 1993b).  
Epistemological Beliefs 
Epistemological beliefs were first investigated by William Perry (1970). His 
longitudinal, phenomenological study revealed increasingly more complex and integrated 
ways of viewing the world as students progressed through their liberal arts studies at 
Harvard and Radcliffe universities. Perry noticed that Harvard liberal arts students moved 
through four main positions, which he described as dualism, multiplism, relativism and 
commitment.  Individuals who held dualistic views about the nature of knowledge 
believed that absolute truths (right/wrong) exist and could be transmitted to an individual 
from an authority or expert. Next, when individuals began to conceive of knowledge in a 
multiplistic way, they conceded that as well as absolute truths, there were some things 
that could not be known with any certainty. Such individuals believed that knowledge 
comprised both personal opinions and ultimate truths. They relied less on authorities for 
absolute truths, and personal opinions and truths were still considered to be “right” or 
“wrong”.  The next position, relativism, constituted a major shift in epistemological 
thinking because individuals considered that knowledge was actively and personally 
constructed, although initially this may have occurred in some contexts only. Absolute 
truths could no longer exist for them because truth was considered to be relative to 
individuals’ personal interpretations of experiences. In the final positions related to 
commitment, relativistic thinking was still a feature, but particular beliefs were more 
valued than others and were committed to in a flexible manner. Although these positions 
were not intended to be gender specific, they were derived using male Harvard students.  
Belenky et al. (1986) described a similar sequence of epistemological 
development with a specific focus on females. Belenky and her colleagues traced the 
development of epistemological beliefs by interviewing 135 women from academic and 
non-academic backgrounds. The women were asked to respond to a number of open-
ended questions which were intended to reflect moral, cognitive and identity 
development. Belenky et al. (1986) postulated five stages in the development of 
epistemological beliefs, which closely aligned with those described by Perry (1981). 
These included received (similar to dualism), subjective (similar to multiplism), 
procedural (similar to relativism) and constructed (similar to relativism commitment) 
ways of knowing. 
Baxter Magolda (1993) also described stages of epistemological development that 
suggested changes in terms of complexity and reflective thinking similar to those 
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described by Perry (1970) and Belenky et al. (1986). Each year, over a seven year period, 
more than 100 college students were interviewed and completed short answer responses 
to open-ended questions on the Measure of Epistemological Reflections (MER) (Baxter 
Magolda, 1994). Within each of the positions, Baxter Magolda (1988) described ways of 
knowing that differed for each gender. Relational modes of knowing were open, flexible, 
connected, responsive, and considered more typical of women's ways of knowing. 
Conversely, the impersonal or objective mode of knowing was characterised by the use of 
logical, algorithmic procedures that result in separateness and abstraction (Baxter 
Magolda, 1993). The positions or beliefs about knowing are described as absolute (similar 
to Perry’s dualism), transitional (similar to Perry’s multiplism), independent (similar to 
Perry’s relativism) and contextual (similar to Perry’s commitment positions).  
 There is ongoing debate concerning the validity of relativistic (Perry, 1970), 
procedural (Belenky et al., 1986) and independent (Baxter Magolda, 1994) ways of 
knowing as developmental ideals (Goldberger, 1996a). Goldberger  (1996a, 1996b) 
recognised that in certain cultures relativistic ways of knowing may not be appropriate, 
although she defended the superiority of such developmental ideals within the American 
context which reflects multiple perspectives of knowing. Similarly, it could be argued that 
there is a need to be aware of, and reflect upon, multiple perspectives in an increasingly 
pluralistic Australian society.  
Developmental epistemological beliefs have also been criticised for their stage-like, 
unidimensional characteristics. Building on the work of Perry and others, Schommer 
conceived of epistemological perspectives as more than a unidimensional set of beliefs that 
developed over time. Over a series of studies, she described a multidimensional set of 'more 
or less' independent beliefs (Schommer 1990, 1993a, 1993b). This means that individuals 
may hold both sophisticated (more relativistic) and naïve (more dualistic) views about the 
nature of knowing. Schommer (1989, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) described five dimensions of 
epistemological beliefs that included (a) Omniscient Authority (beliefs in the source of 
knowledge), (b) Certain Knowledge (beliefs in the certainty of knowledge), (c) Simple 
Knowledge (beliefs in structure of knowledge), (d) Quick Learning (beliefs in the speed of 
learning), and (e) Innate Ability (beliefs in the stability of knowledge) (Schommer, 1990).  
More recently, Schommer (1994) has conceptualised such beliefs as a kind of 
frequency distribution where Αfor example, sophisticated learners may believe a vast 
amount of knowledge is evolving, some knowledge is yet to be discovered, and a very small 
amount of knowledge is unchanging. . .  On the other hand, naïve learners may believe a 
vast amount of information is certain, some knowledge is yet to be discovered, and a very 
small amount of knowledge is changing.≅ (Schommer, 1994, p.302).  This multiplicity of 
dimensions suggests "that epistemological beliefs do not necessarily develop in synchrony" 
(Schommer, 1994, p.302) and that learning may in fact be determined by individual as well 
as by a combination of beliefs. 
Schommer’s research  (see, for example, Schommer & Walker, 1995) has also shown 
that epistemological beliefs may be generalisable across domains rather than domain specific. 
This generalisability has also been recognised in individuals’ epistemological beliefs in 
reflective judgment research (King & Kitchener, 1994). Conversely, Mori (1997) believed 
that epistemological beliefs are context specific. He examined the link between general 
epistemological beliefs and epistemological beliefs related to language learning in 97 college 
students who were learning Japanese and found that mostly these two dimensions were 
uncorrelated and independent of each other. Beers (1988) and Roth and Roychoudhury 
(1994) similarly reported that epistemological beliefs are more likely to be context specific. 
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 A third perspective in this debate is that epistemological beliefs can be both 
generalised and context specific. Ruddick (1996) postulated that people have different 
epistemological beliefs in different contexts and yet conceded that Αprolonged focus on 
any of these kinds of inquiries may well produce cognitive capacities and attitudes that 
recur to different degrees in epistemologically dissimilar contexts≅ (pp. 254-255). This 
suggests that, while epistemological beliefs may be context specific, it is possible that 
they may also be held across a range of contexts, giving the impression that they are 
generalisable. In the current study, a focus will be maintained on generalised 
epistemological beliefs, whilst acknowledging the possibility of some context specific 
beliefs. 
 It is likely that epistemological beliefs, which are considered to filter all knowledge 
and beliefs, may influence beliefs about learning and teaching in specific learning situations 
and, therefore, how a person is likely to approach learning/teaching in particular contexts. 
This has implications for teacher educators who wish to help students to develop 
contstructivist beliefs in teaching and learning. Constructivism is the belief that “individuals 
learn as they wrestle cognitively with problems of concern to them" (Shaver, 1992, p.17). It 
refers to a particular set of beliefs that understanding exists only for the individual who 
actively creates such beliefs. Regardless of whether knowledge is conceived of as 
individually or socially constructed, constructivism involves cognitive tasks that link new to 
prior knowledge, the individualisation of learning outcomes, and learning that is context-
specific (Tynjälä, 1997).  
 Most developmental epistemological schemes, regardless of their research focus, 
cover a range of adult epistemological beliefs from naïve to sophisticated. Throughout the 
current study the term naïve will be used to refer to beliefs that truth is certain, absolute and 
able to be transferred by an authority. The use of the term sophisticated will refer to those 
beliefs that truth is relative, changing, and actively constructed by the individual. This 
terminology is commonly used in the epistemological beliefs literature (Kardash & Scholes, 
1996) and will facilitate understanding in the current discussion. It may be important to help 
student teachers to reflect on their epistemological beliefs to facilitate the development of 
more sophisticated beliefs. 
Changing Teacher Beliefs 
Student teachers' epistemological beliefs are often not addressed within teacher 
education programs (Nespor, 1987). Griffith and Benson (1991) described how education has 
been likened to a factory model in the past with specific content mastery a desired outcome 
of educational experiences. Such a positivistic perspective does not promote a view that 
knowledge needs to be personally constructed and relative to specific contexts. There is 
growing evidence to suggest that it is important to consider preservice teachers' beliefs, in 
particular epistemological beliefs, in teacher education since such beliefs will influence 
performance in the classroom (Lawrence, 1992; Pajares, 1992; Renne, 1992; Richardson et 
al., 1991; Shaver, 1992; Wilson, 1990).  
Implementing interventions designed to change epistemological beliefs may prove to 
be a slow (Baxter Magolda, 1988) and difficult task (Davis, 1997; Ryder, 1994; Wilson, 
1990). The more a belief is connected with other beliefs within the attitude structure, the  
more central the belief and impervious to change (Rokeach, 1968). Therefore, 
epistemological beliefs as central beliefs may be difficult to change. Posner, Strike, Hewson 
& Gertzog (1982) believed that Αscientific metaphysical beliefs, like epistemological 
commitments, are central to a conception≅ and also noted Αthe importance of the strength 
and depth of a metaphysical belief in determining whether assimilation of accommodation 
occurs.≅ (p.219). To facilitate change in beliefs about learning, it may be necessary to 
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encourage students to reflect explicitly on their epistemological beliefs. Such explicit 
reflection and awareness may facilitate the development of higher order beliefs, which are 
typically more controvertible because they are consciously held (Rokeach, 1968).   
Teaching programs aimed at improving learning may need to focus explicitly on 
students’ epistemological beliefs. Lyons (1990) supports this view: ΑTeaching the way of 
knowing ought to be part of teacher education programs≅ (p. 176). Schommer (1994) 
recommended that teachers should model active construction of meaning, communicate that 
learning typically requires struggle and conflict (emotion), and facilitate the linking of theory 
with individuals= prior knowledge. The focus of interventions should not necessarily be on 
the evolution of dualists into relativists but should attempt to help students see that 
sometimes critical interpretation is necessary to arrive at reasonable perspectives and that a 
multiple realities perspective promotes a focus on personal construction of truth rather than 
relying on receiving truths (Kardash & Scholes, 1996).  
Only a few studies have endeavoured to focus on helping students to reflect explicitly 
on epistemological beliefs. Hettich (1990) described an attempt to get students to analyse 
their journal entries in terms of Perry=s epistemological positions following a lecture and 
related reading. This constituted an analytical reflection on how some of their writing could 
be analysed according to these positions: Αthey were subsequently asked to categorise and 
justify their journal entries≅ (p. 38). He concluded that ΑTelling students about Perry=s 
cognitive stages of development provides information about this model of critical thinking;    
. . .  does not necessarily advance them through stages.≅ (p. 38). Baxter Magolda (1986) 
reflected on a teaching program that, among other things, required students to reflect on their 
own development in terms of Perry=s positions as part of the curriculum and assessment 
requirements. This study was concerned with developing active teaching modes rather than 
encouraging students to reflect on epistemological beliefs as a way to invoke epistemological 
development. Stanton (1996) reported on a teaching program used with first year students in 
a women=s college that was designed to engage students in self reflection, dialogue and the 
development of relevant skills. This included a focus on connected knowing, collaboration, 
and voice (two-way interactions between teacher and learners). It specifically incorporated 
interactive workshops and reflection on learning strategies and the self as a knower. Overall, 
students in the intervention group showed higher grades, retention rates, ego and career 
development and, two years later, more sophisticated ways of knowing.  
Some studies have not been so successful in instigating changes in epistemological 
beliefs. Roth and Roychoudhury (1994) found that for a sample of Year 10 and 11 physics 
students, a constructivist learning environment did not promote changes in their 
epistemological beliefs. The eighth grade science students in Davis= (1997) study also 
developed learning strategies that focussed on understanding as a result of a constructivist 
intervention but did not make substantial changes regarding their process beliefs 
(epistemological beliefs). What seems to be highlighted in the studies described by Roth and 
Roychroudhury (1994) and Davis (1997) is the need to consider students' epistemological 
beliefs as well as their learning environment. It may not be sufficient to implement a 
constructivist intervention without consideration of the changes that must occur in students' 
epistemological beliefs. It also exemplifies how difficult it is to change students' 
epistemological beliefs even in an environment that supports constructivist perspectives of 
learning (Roth & Roychoudhury, 1994).  
Although there is some evidence in the literature of interventions focussed on 
developing epistemological beliefs, it seems that this area is still relatively unchartered 
(Kardash & Scholes, 1996). The results of this study will add to the literature regarding 
epistemological beliefs interventions.   
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Method 
This study is a report of how epistemological beliefs changed in a group of pre-
service graduate teacher education students as the result of a teaching program that was 
focused on explicit reflection on such beliefs. This group will be referred to as the research 
group (RG). Another group of students who were not engaged in the teaching program 
functioned as the comparison group (CG). Specifically the research question was: What 
changes take place in students’ epistemological beliefs as a result of a teaching program 
designed to help them reflect explicitly on such beliefs? 
The Participants 
The teaching program took place in a preservice teacher education context at the 
Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Queensland, Australia, with 29 Graduate 
Diploma in Education students engaged in a year-long educational psychology unit. There 
were 25 students in the comparison group, which comprised another educational psychology 
tutorial group in the same course. The Graduate Diploma in Education (primary) was a one 
year course that prepared individuals with undergraduate degrees to teach in Queensland 
primary schools. The graduate students were chosen because they were engaged in this unit 
for the whole year as opposed to one semester as often happens in many undergraduate 
courses. Therefore, this constituted purposive sampling whereby students were selected  
because of their year-long engagement in the unit (cf. Lincoln & Guba, 1985). It was 
anticipated that the longer time frame would offer more opportunities for students to reflect 
on, and possibly reconstruct, their epistemological beliefs. 
Considerable discussion took place with students regarding the nature of the teaching 
program and how it compared with the regular tutorial sessions in terms of assessment and 
content.  This enabled students to make a more informed choice about their participation in 
the study. Although students were offered the opportunity to withdraw from the teaching 
program and join another tutorial group, no one refused to participate. The undergraduate 
qualifications of students in the research group included degrees in Business, Social Science, 
Leisure Management, Psychology, Visual and Performing Arts, Science, Literature, and 
Nursing. The group comprised 3 males and 26 females. The mean age for the group was 
27.65 years. As a group, students reported a considerable range of prior teaching experiences. 
These included secondary school teaching, training experience in the workplace, tutoring 
experience, parenting experiences, helpers at camps and church functions, classroom 
volunteers, working in after school care, and working as a teacher aide. The research and 
comparison groups were similar to each other in terms of undergraduate disciplines, gender 
balance, mean age, and prior teaching experiences.  
Students= Learning Environments 
The students in the teaching program were required to engage with the same tutorial 
content as the students in the comparison group. However, the RG students were asked to 
reflect on the content in relation to the epistemological beliefs literature and their own 
epistemological beliefs. For example, when discussing the topic of cognitive development, 
students also reflected on the development of intellectual functioning from an 
epistemological perspective (e.g., Perry=s work). A relational organisation for the course 
content (Biggs & Collis, 1982) was therefore provided by encouraging students to link 
tutorial content to an epistemological beliefs framework. This means that the students’ 
epistemological beliefs provided a theme for the content of the unit. 
Apart from the relational organisation of content, the teaching strategies used in the 
teaching program also reflected relational pedagogy (Baxter Magolda, 1996). Relational 
pedagogy involves connected teaching strategies that encourage the use of both relational 
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(aspects of self) and objectivist (aspects of theory) ways of knowing in students (Baxter 
Magolda, 1993). Appendix 1 provides a summary of the themes of relational pedagogy and 
how the teaching program used these strategies to help RG students to reflect on their 
epistemological beliefs. 
Students in the research group wrote regular journal reflections as a key feature of the 
teaching program. Essentially the journals helped students to reflect explicitly on their 
epistemological beliefs. The journal writing process required students to connect self and 
theory. Students wrote at least eight required journal entries throughout the year related to 
specific topics discussed in the educational psychology unit. Information that offered 
guidelines for writing journals was distributed and considerable discussion took place in 
tutorials regarding the process of reflection. 
The use of journal reflections and inquirer feedback on each reflection used a process 
similar to that described by Guba and Lincoln (1989) as the hermeneutic-dialectic (HD) 
cycle. Typically in an HD cycle, an individual is selected for interview, constructions emerge 
and then these constructions are presented to the next interviewee for comment and 
reflection. The various constructions related to epistemological beliefs that emerged in the 
journal reflections (and Time 1 interviews) were selected to represent a range of 
epistemological beliefs and then presented to the students as a whole group through the 
tutorial discussions to stimulate further thought. 
In the comparison group, the inquirer interacted with the students in a way that did 
not incorporate a focus on epistemological beliefs and journal reflections, but included 
features of tutorial work that the inquirer typically used. These included small group 
discussions that reflected on tutorial content and readings, large group discussions of tutorial 
content and readings, and activities based on tutorial material to encourage involvement. 
Quantitative Data Collection  
Students in both the research and comparison groups completed the epistemological 
beliefs questionnaire (Schommer, 1988, 1990) at Time 1 and Time 2 to provide information 
about changes in their epistemological beliefs. This five-point, 63-item Likert type 
questionnaire was designed to elicit students= beliefs about Simple Knowledge, Certain 
Knowledge, Innate Ability, Quick Learning, and Omniscient Authority.  
The 5 second-order factors are further differentiated as 12 first-order factors that 
include Seek Single Answers, Avoid Integration (Simple Knowledge); Avoid Ambiguity, 
Knowledge Is Certain (Certain Knowledge); Depend On Authority, Do Not Criticise 
Authority (Omniscient Authority); Ability To Learn Is Innate, Can Not Learn How To Learn, 
Success Is Unrelated To Hard Work (Innate Ability); and Learn The First Time, Learning Is 
Quick, Concentrated Effort Is A Waste Of Time (Quick Learning). Approximately half the 
items are written so that students with naïve beliefs would agree with them and half are 
written in a way that would cause students with naïve beliefs to disagree. Students rate the 
items from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Higher scores represent more naïve 
epistemological beliefs. 
Test-retest reliability is reported as being in the order of  .70 (Schommer et al., 1997). 
The alpha coefficient indicates internal consistency as a measure of reliability and measures 
the extent to which items in a questionnaire agree with each other to see if they are measuring 
the same thing (Burns, 1994). The higher the inter-item correlations, the greater the alpha 
value (Burns, 1994). Inter-item reliabilities for individual items within each factor range from 
.63 to .85 (Schommer 1993b).  
Predictive validity has been established in a series of studies. Factors have predicted 
different aspects of learning after controlling for intelligence. Beliefs in Quick Learning 
determined levels of monitoring understanding, the quality of summarising and test 
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performance for social science and physical science passages (Schommer, 1990). Beliefs in 
Certain Knowledge predicted interpretation of tentative information (Schommer, Crouse & 
Rhodes, 1992). With regard to mathematical texts, beliefs in Simple Knowledge predicted an 
individual=s understanding and ability to monitor that understanding (Schommer et al., 
1992). Beliefs in Innate Ability were predictive of motivation to persevere with a difficult 
task (Dweck & Bempechat, 1983 cited in Schommer, 1993b). 
Qualitative Data Collection 
 Qualitative data were collected to provide a different perspective on changes in 
epistemological beliefs over time.  
Research group. At Time 1(the beginning of the year-long unit) and Time 2 (the 
conclusion of the year-long unit), students were interviewed regarding their beliefs about 
knowing. These interviews took between 35 and 60 minutes, with the average being 
approximately 40 minutes in duration. They were conducted on the university campus and 
audio taped for later transcription. Time 1 interviews were conducted in the first two weeks 
of semester before any discussions about learning and teaching took place in the tutorial 
sessions. These audio tapes were transcribed verbatim by the students. The Time 2 interviews 
were conducted by the interviewer, audio taped, and transcribed verbatim. 
The interviews were semi-structured with questions that enabled information to be 
gained about specific beliefs and also allowed students to discuss topics openly within such 
parameters. The questions related to beliefs about knowing were similar to those used by 
Belenky et al. (1986) in their study of women=s ways of knowing. In particular students were 
asked to describe their beliefs about the nature of truth and how it was obtained. The same 
interview questions were posed at Time 1 and Time 2. See Appendix 2 for more details. 
Comparison group. Qualitative data were collected for the comparison group by 
asking students to complete written statements about their beliefs about knowing. The first 
set of written statements was collected at the commencement of the unit in week one. Written 
statements were collected again at the end of the year to monitor any changes in 
epistemological beliefs. The same questions were posed at Time 1 and Time 2. 
Data Analysis 
Questionnaires. The method of determining pretest-posttest change used in this study 
was an analysis of variance for repeated measures. Using this method, time (Time 1 and Time 
2) is considered to be one factor, while the experimental and control treatments are the other 
factor. In this type of analysis the interaction between time of measurement and treatment is 
important. That is, are the means of the research group=s pretest and posttest scores 
significantly greater or less than for the comparison group (Borg & Gall, 1989). ΑThe 
statistical significance of these differences between groups is determined by doing a 2 way 
(treatment group X time of testing) analysis of variance. A statistically significant F ratio 
means that the pre-posttest difference between the two groups is reliably greater or less than 
for the other group≅ (Borg & Gall, 1989, p. 733). 
Interviews and written statements. The categories of epistemological beliefs that 
emerged at Time 1 were used to analyse the interviews and written statements at Time 2. This 
made it possible to look for changes in beliefs over time. CG students wrote statements about 
their beliefs about knowing using similar questions to those posed in the interviews. 
Although it was recognised that comparing written statements with interview responses had 
its limitations, the interviews constituted part of the teaching program and therefore could not 
be used as a source of data collection for the comparison group. It was anticipated that 
questionnaire data would be triangulated with the written statement data, thereby offering a 
way to validate the analysis of written statements.  
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The analysis used a predominantly inductive approach, which drew on relevant 
literature to interpret responses. Such a descriptive-interpretative approach to analysis still 
made it possible to take account of many viewpoints before deriving theory (Maykut & 
Morehouse, 1996). The categories that emerged were audited by a second person to 
establish trustworthiness and credibility (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). QSR NUD*IST 
(Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising) (Richards & 
Richards, 1994) was used to assist in the organisation of data emerging from the 
transcriptions of the audiotapes.  
 
Results 
The results of this study are presented in two sections. The first section is a report of 
the analysis of the questionnaire data.  The second section is a comparison of changes in 
epistemological beliefs using the interview and written statement data. 
Analysis of Questionnaire Data  
        Results from a repeated measured analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed significant 
differences between the research and comparison groups on two of the five scales: Quick 
Learning and Certain Knowledge (See Table 1). First, there were significant differences 
between the two groups regarding Quick Learning.  This difference derived largely from a 
significant difference between the two groups on the subscale Learning is Quick. Over the 
year, CG students reported more beliefs that learning should be quick while the RG students' 
reports of beliefs in quick learning declined marginally. Second, there were significant 
differences noted between groups over time regarding the scale Certain Knowledge. The RG 
students' responses indicated a decline in beliefs that ambiguity should be avoided while the 
CG students' responses did not change in this regard. Such a decline in beliefs that 
ambiguity should be avoided indicated a movement towards a relativistic view of truth.  
        There were no significant differences noted in the other three scales. However, there 
were significant differences between groups regarding the two subscales Cannot Learn How 
To Learn (part of the scale Innate Ability) and Depend On Authority (part of the scale 
Omniscient Authority). With regard to the first subscale, Cannot Learn How To Learn, the 
RG students reported more sophisticated beliefs over the year, by describing fewer beliefs 
that an individual's ability to learn is unchangeable. The CG Students, conversely, reported 
an increase in beliefs that individuals cannot learn how to learn. An analysis of the second 
subscale, Depend On Authority, also indicated significant differences between groups. The 
RG students reported fewer beliefs that they depended on authorities. The CG students, 
conversely, demonstrated a slight increase in beliefs that an individual could depend on an 
authority.  
        To summarise, the RG students demonstrated an increased sophistication of beliefs 
about Quick Learning and Certain Knowledge over the year when compared with the CG 
students. This increased sophistication was also noted in the subscales Cannot Learn How 
To Learn (subscale of Innate Ability) and Depend On Authority (subscale of Omniscient 
Authority).  
INSERT TABLE  i  HERE 
Analysis of Interviews and Written Statements  
Overall, the comments made by students regarding their epistemological beliefs could 
be divided into four main categories at Time 1 and Time 2. These were construct reasoned 
truths (CON beliefs), construct reasoned truths and receive absolute truths (CONREC beliefs), 
construct subjective truths and receive absolute truths (SUBREC beliefs) and receive absolute 
truths (REC beliefs). The categories are described and exemplified in Table 2.  
 To summarise, most students coded as having CON beliefs that individuals constructed 
 
 
 
10
personal truths supported by evidence, also indicated that experts facilitated the construction of 
reasoned truths. Students with CONREC beliefs about truth believed that individuals 
constructed reasoned truths and that individuals received truths. However, these students 
believed that experts facilitated the reception of absolute truths. When students were coded as 
having SUBREC beliefs, they believed that individuals constructed personal truths, which were 
not supported with evidence, and received absolute truths. These students also believed that 
experts facilitated the reception of absolute truths. The student with REC beliefs, who believed 
that individuals received absolute truths, also viewed experts as facilitating the reception of 
such absolute truths.  
 
There were some students who seemed to describe beliefs as if they emerged from 
two different people. These students were categorised as having INCONSISTENT beliefs. 
For example, some students described both CON and CONREC beliefs about the nature of 
truth in separate sections of their interview responses. This means that some students 
responded to the question ΑWhat is truth?≅ by indicating that individuals construct personal 
truths that are supported with evidence but then responded differently in other parts of the 
interview in a way that clearly indicated the less sophisticated category of CONREC beliefs. 
Another way in which some students described INCONSISTENT beliefs was by describing 
CONREC beliefs about truth and then a belief that experts facilitated the construction of 
reasoned truths. To summarise, students coded as having INCONSISTENT and CONREC 
beliefs described mixed beliefs that individuals construct reasoned truths and receive absolute 
truths. However, the students with INCONSISTENT  beliefs demonstrated stronger beliefs 
that individuals construct reasoned truths.  
 
INSERT TABLE  ii  HERE 
 
Comparison of Beliefs at Time 1 and Time 2 
Individuals were categorised according to their dominant belief. The percentages of 
individuals with CON, INCONSISTENT, CONREC, SUBREC and REC beliefs in both 
groups at Time 1 and Time 2 are presented in Table 3. Wherever possible the questionnaire 
data is used to triangulate with the qualitative data analysis. This provides a way to support 
the analysis of written statements and interview responses. 
 
INSERT TABLE  iii  HERE 
 The biggest difference between the two groups at Time 2 relates to changes in 
INCONSISTENT beliefs. The RG students have experienced stronger growth in 
sophistication of epistemological beliefs because of a greater increase in the percentage of 
students with INCONSISTENT beliefs over the year. The results of the Schommer 
questionnaire analysis also supported this trend. The students in the research group, as 
opposed to the comparison group, evidenced more sophisticated epistemological beliefs over 
time regarding the dimensions of Certain Knowledge, Quick Learning, Depend On 
Authorities (a subscale of Omniscient Authority) and Can Not Learn How To Learn (a 
subscale of  Innate Ability) (See Table 1). 
Although there were differences noted between groups regarding SUBREC beliefs, 
this could be expected given the lack of detail that was sometimes noted in the written 
statements. That is, at Time 1, students in the research group only were coded as having 
SUBREC beliefs possibly because they could articulate more clearly what they meant by 
opinions. Therefore, they were able to be placed in the SUBREC subcategory because they 
described unreasoned opinions and truths. This, of course, may cast doubt on some of the 
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responses that have been coded as CONREC beliefs for the comparison group. 
In response to the research question, What changes take place in students’ 
epistemological beliefs as a result of a teaching program designed to help them reflect 
explicitly on such beliefs?, there is some evidence that more students in the research group 
than the comparison group described sophisticated epistemological beliefs over time. The 
differences related to individuals= epistemological beliefs have been noted in both the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. More students in the research group, rather than the 
comparison group, reported sophisticated epistemological beliefs at Time 2, suggesting that 
the teaching program may have helped students to develop more sophisticated 
epistemological beliefs or perhaps knowledge about such beliefs.  
Discussion 
Although most teacher educators would recognise the importance of helping students 
to develop sophisticated beliefs about knowing, often teacher education programs do not 
provide the scaffolding to facilitate this development. This study has reported on an 
intervention to support such belief development. Intervening in order to change 
epistemological beliefs may be a slow (Baxter Magolda, 1988) and difficult process (Davis, 
1997; Ryder, 1994; Wilson, 1990). The analysis of Schommers' epistemological beliefs 
questionnaire (1988, 1990) revealed that the dimensions of Quick Learning and Certain 
Knowledge show increased sophistication of beliefs for the RG students when compared with 
the CG students. The qualitative data showed slight changes in epistemological beliefs over 
the course of the year. That is, individuals in the research group have experienced a stronger 
growth in INCONSISTENT beliefs over the year.  
When individuals are encouraged to reflect on and possibly reconstruct their existing 
beliefs, they may experience confusion or disequilibrium (Piaget, 1954, 1963 cited in 
Woolfolk, 1998). In the current study, the increase in the number of students who described 
INCONSISTENT beliefs may reflect such confusion that emerges from wrestling with 
discrepancies between pre-existing beliefs and new information. This would indicate that the 
teaching program has helped students to start the process of changing epistemological beliefs.  
Another explanation for the increase in the number of students with INCONSISTENT 
beliefs may be that they espoused knowledge about epistemological beliefs rather than 
actually changing their beliefs. These students were asked to read some of the 
epistemological beliefs literature to inform their journal reflections. However, even if some 
of these espoused changes reflect knowledge only, then such knowledge should also 
ultimately be of benefit in learning and teaching from a metacognitive perspective. 
Considering that metacognition involves a knowledge and process component, it seems likely 
that meta-metacognitive awareness (Kitchener, 1983), which is an awareness of one’s 
epistemological beliefs, would also involve similar aspects. This study has sought to address 
meta-metacognition through direct reflection on the nature of epistemological beliefs and 
through the reflective processes involved in journal writing and discussions. Such meta-
metacognitive awareness is also considered an essential teaching characteristic needed for 
dealing with ill-defined problems that are so typical of everyday interactions in school 
environments (Kitchener, 1983). Ill-defined problems are those that do not have single 
correct solutions and involve attending to multiple perspectives to address the problem. 
Kitchener believed that for well defined, simple problems described as puzzles, the use of 
metacognitive strategies is sufficient. However, ill-defined problems require meta-
metacognitive processes to help interpret problems and define the limitations of solutions. 
For example, if an individual believes knowledge is absolute and truths can be transmitted, 
then for both puzzles and ill-defined problems the solution will be to apply an algorithm or a 
correct procedure. Conversely, an individual who has more sophisticated, relativistic beliefs 
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about knowing may believe that alternative solutions may be constructed to solve the 
problem (King & Kitchener, 1994; Kitchener, 1983).  
In conclusion, it is proposed that the teaching program, with its focus on encouraging 
students to reflect on epistemological beliefs, has helped students become more 
meta-metacognitive. According to Rokeach (1968), explicit awareness means that such 
beliefs then become “controvertible because the believer has learned that some of his 
reference persons and groups do not share his belief” (Rokeach, 1968, p. 10). Teacher 
education programs need to help students to be more meta-metacognitive and focus explicitly 
on their epistemological beliefs in order to promote such belief change. 
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Appendix 1: A description of the teaching program based on relational pedagogy (adapted from Baxter 
Magolda, 1993) 
 
Themes:Relational 
pedagogy 
 
Characteristics of extended relational pedagogy 
 
How the teaching program facilitated development of epistemol
 
Mutual respect 
 
learning environment free from threat; midwife 
model and conflict model used  students valued as 
learners 
 
Journal feedback and small group discussion  designed to challen
respected and valued in class discussions and journal writing 
 
Situating learning in 
students' experiences 
 
 
students see themselves as constructors of 
knowledge; students make links to prior 
knowledge which validates them as learners  
 
Constant reflection on epistemological beliefs and educational ps
practical and personal experiences (students describe their own e
students in journals and discussions to construct their own views 
 
Constructivism in knowing 
and learning   
 
(A) collaborate with their peers in small group 
work to gain access to other people=s viewpoints 
 
(A) tutorial sessions incorporate small group discussions and acti
 
 
 
(B) discussion formats in tutorials rather than 
lecture-based learning environments.  
 
(B) minimal use of large group lectures 
 
 
 
(C) use of both affective and cognitive 
dimensions of learning to facilitate sophisticated 
epistemological beliefs  
 
(C) journals used so that students link personal beliefs with theor
personal epistemological beliefs in journal entries and tutorial gro
 
 
 
 
(D) making explicit epistemological beliefs 
underpinning courses and units 
 
(D) teacher makes epistemological assumptions of course clear in
 
 
 
(E) teacher models constructivist beliefs 
 
(E) teacher thinks out loud; use of assessments that aligned with a
students to develop personal meaning and connect to their own re
 
 
 
(F) teachers need sophisticated epistemological 
beliefs; movement away from teacher centred 
control of learning environment. 
 
(F) share authority in tutorials; students direct some discussions -
construction with the inquirer co-learning with students.  
 
 
 
 
(G) reconstructions of beliefs fostered through 
challenge to see the inadequacy of their beliefs in 
a nurturing environment 
 
(G) encourage students to see the inadequacies of their existing b
reconstruction of these beliefs - using small group discussion; jou
epistemological beliefs as content for the subject; reflect on other
epistemological beliefs;  non-threatening atmosphere; sharing of 
alignment of assessment and teaching goals (through journal asse
understanding);  teacher modelling constructivist ways of knowin
impersonal and relational ways of knowing through journal writin
dialogical and critical thinking in journals enables to students to r
epistemological level; guidelines and discussion held regarding th
at the beginning of the subject  
assist students to see how these newly acquired beliefs are helpfu
to practice teaching and general life experiences in discussions an
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Appendix 2: Beliefs about knowing interview and written statement questions. 
 
Sometimes people talk about “searching for truth.”  I’m not sure what they’re talking about.  What are your 
views?  In learning about something you really want to know, what is the role of an expert? How do you 
know when you know something? 
Probes 
How do you know someone is an expert? What do you feel and what do you do when experts disagree? 
What do you do if lecturers disagree? 
If experts disagree on something today, do you think that some day they will come to some agreement?  
Why or why not? How do you know what is right/true? 
Do you agree with this person who says that where there are no right answers anybody’s opinion is as good 
as another's? Can you think of an opinion that you think is wrong?
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Table i 
Descriptive statistics and results of the ANOVA  for Schommers= epistemological beliefs questionnaire  
 
RG CG 
Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest 
 
 
Scales 
and Subscales 
M   sd         M   sd         M sd         M sd F ratio 
Quick Learning 2.275 (n=24) .436 2.229 (n=24) .390 2.188 (n=26) .402  2.527 (n=26) .567 7.30* 
Learning Is Quick 2.217 (n=24) .598 2.158 (n=24) .468 1.992 (n=26) .433 2.485 (n=26) .569 9.97* 
Learn First Time 1.987 (n=26) .663 2.000 (n=26) .508 2.090 (n=26) .677 2.410 (n=26) .925 1.51 
Concentrated Effort Waste Time 2.788 (n=26) .815 2.904 (n=26) .813 2.827 (n=26) .948 2.808 (n=26) .749 .23 
          
Certain Knowledge 2.962 (n=24) .485 2.602 (n=24) .557 2.600 (n=25) .574 2.673 (n=25) .629 9.37* 
Avoid Ambiguity 2.942 (n=24) .674 2.817 (n=24) .693 2.576 (n=25) .578 2.944 (n=25) .749 8.15* 
Knowledge Is Certain 2.927 (n=25) .605 2.460 (n=25) .741 2.628 (n=26) .750 2.436 (n=26) .718 1.89 
Avoid Integration 2.855 (n=25) .485 2.550 (n=25) .688 2.913 (n=26) .543 2.567(n=26) .542 .07 
 
Innate Ability 2.577 (n=22) .534 2.479 (n=22) .349 2.518 (n=26) .404 2.663 (n=26) .493 2.89 
Cannot Learn How To Learn 2.896 (n=25) .740 2.640 (n=25) .600 2.708 (n=26) .564 2.923 (n=26) .554 8.05* 
Success Unrelated Hard Work 2.344 (n=24) .729 2.438 (n=24) .543 2.135 (n=26) .746 2.346 (n=26) .975 .19 
Ability To Learn Is Innate 2.480 (n=25) .478 2.350 (n=25) .591 2.663 (n=26) .587 2.654 (n=26) .633 .49 
 
Omniscient Authority 2.583 (n=23) .394 2.465 (n=23) .466 2.569 (n=26) .432 2.496 (n=26) .402 .13 
Depend On Authority 3.213 (n=27) .566 2.944 (n=27) .732 3.125 (n=26) .580 3.221 (n=26) .567 4.70* 
Don't Criticise Authority 2.181 (n=24) .448 2.139 (n=24) .529 2.199 (n=26) .600 2.013 (n=26) .566 .71 
 
Simple Knowledge 2.947 (n=23) .313 2.638 (n=23) .529 2.998 (n=24) .364 2.671 (n=24) .382 .02 
Seek Single Answers 3.055(n=23) .304 2.731(n=23) .475 3.030 (n=24) .462 2.731(n=24) .407 .04 
Avoid Integration 2.855(n=25) .485 2.550(n=25) .688 2.913 (n=26) .543 2.567(n=26) .542 .07 
        *p<.05.
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Table ii 
Descriptions and exemplars for categories of epistemological beliefs  
 
Categories Descriptions Example statements 
Construct 
reasoned truths  
(CON) 
How: individuals construct personal truths that are 
supported with evidence; this means that individuals 
actively create their own truths rather than passively 
receive truths that are a direct representation of 
reality.  Experts facilitate the construction of 
reasoned truths 
What: individuals have opinions that are reasoned 
hence some opinions are better than others because 
they are informed by current research and experience 
 I think that is all tied in with my beliefs on not being 
an absolute right or an absolute wrong and people 
are entitled to their own opinions as long as their 
opinions are valid, are reasoned out, they are not just 
an opinion off the top of their head. They have 
actually reasoned out their opinions and said well I 
think it is because of such and such so I think 
knowledge is a very personal thing as well. (52) 
Construct 
reasoned truths 
and receive 
absolute truths 
 
 (CONREC) 
How: individuals construct personal truths that are 
supported with evidence and individuals receive 
absolute (right/wrong and universal) truths from an 
external source; this means that individuals actively 
create their own truths and passively receive truths 
that are a direct representation of reality. Experts 
facilitate the reception of absolute truths  
What: individuals have opinions that are reasoned 
and truths that are absolute (right/wrong and 
universal  
I still think that. . . there are some things that are, you 
know obviously true, maybe like some of the maths, 
like some things are black and white but generally 
truth still for me comes from taking what is around 
you and putting your own interpretation on lots of 
things, so I guess listening to other people and 
making some judgements I suppose about what you 
believe about that. (32) 
Construct 
subjective truths 
and receive 
absolute truths  
(SUBREC) 
 
How: individuals construct personal truths but these 
truths are not supported with evidence and 
individuals receive absolute (right/wrong and 
universal) truths from an external source;  this means 
that individuals actively create their own truths 
which are intuitive rather than informed and 
passively receive truths that are a direct 
representation of reality. Experts facilitate the 
reception of absolute truths 
What: individuals have opinions that are not 
reasoned but are subjective in nature and truths that 
are absolute (right/wrong, universal)  
I still think truth is made up of personal opinion so I 
strongly still believe that it is one=s opinion, truth is. 
And it can change to varying sort of different 
situations and things like that. So I think it is a 
personal sort of thing. . . [An opinion is] something 
you may not know much about but you have sort of a 
feeling inside. . . (43).  
Receive absolute 
truths  
(REC) 
How: individuals receive absolute (right/wrong and 
universal) truths from an external source; this means 
that individuals passively receive truths that are a 
direct representation of reality. Experts facilitate the 
reception of absolute truths  
What: individuals have truths that are absolute 
(right/wrong, universal) truths  
When I talk about truth I guess. . .things that are pretty 
much laid out as in I believe in absolute not relativistic 
truths. . . The best way I can give it is as an analogy - 
if you have a white board and you look at the white 
board it is white but if somebody else looks at the 
white board through rose coloured glasses they think it 
is rose where in fact it hasn=t changed the fact that the 
white board is still white. (48) 
 
Note. The numbers in brackets that follow quotes refer to student identification numbers.  
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Table iii 
Between-group comparison of individuals= overall epistemological beliefs at Time 1 & Time 2 
 
Epistemological beliefs (%) 
    CON  INCONa CONREC    SUBREC  REC  
Time 
phases 
 
 RG CG RG  CG RG  CG RG  CG RG  CG 
Time 1 14  15 21  15 42  69 18   -- 4  -- 
Time 2 38  35 48  24 10  41 --   -- 4  -- 
 
Note. Dashes indicate that data were not obtained for that subcategory. The number of individuals espousing 
various beliefs in each group is expressed as a percentage of the group=s sample size.  
aThis is an abbreviated form of INCONSISTENT beliefs 
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